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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important health 
policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of ﬁ ndings and exposing 
gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and new insights to 
inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis 
Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, please go 
to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
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Findings
Many U.S. states are now in their fifth year of a medical malpractice “crisis”, a period of volatil-
ity in the malpractice insurance market characterized by above average increases in premiums, 
contractions in the supply of insurance and deterioration in the financial health of carriers.1
Improving insurer financial ratios suggest that the malpractice crisis is now abating in some 
states, but malpractice crises are a recurring problem. This has been the third period of rapidly 
rising premiums in the last 30 years, following crises in the mid-1980s and mid-1970s. States, 
which are responsible for regulating malpractice insurance, have enacted a variety of reforms 
to prevent or temper malpractice crises, but there is a paucity of reliable information available 
to policy-makers about the effects of these reforms and the impact of the malpractice crisis on 
health care delivery. While a voluminous number of reports have been produced, most are not 
based on rigorous analysis. There are several studies that appear trustworthy, however, and the 
substantive findings in this Synthesis Report are based on those studies.
This Synthesis Report examines the evidence on these questions:
• How does a volatile malpractice environment affect health care delivery?
• What has been the impact of state tort reforms on premiums, claims frequency, claims 
payouts and physican supply?
  
While the weight of the evidence suggests that the malpractice crisis has had a modest effect 
on physician supply, the evidence base is not yet adequate to draw conclusions about whether 
patients’ access to high-risk services has been compromised as a result. The literature evaluat-
ing state tort reforms, while problematic due to methodological issues, does offer some useful 
findings. Caps on noneconomic damages are the most common and most effective reform, 
although they disproportionately burden the most severely injured patients.
This Synthesis Report is one in a series addressing medical malpractice insurance issues. The 
series also includes a Primer, which describes how medical malpractice insurance works and 
the causes of malpractice crises, and a Policy Brief, which summarizes the findings of this 
Synthesis Report. 
Introduction
1 Some crises are characterized by both premium increases and supply contractions, while others have one but not both of 
these phenomena.
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How does a volatile malpractice environment affect health care delivery?
Physician and insurer groups have claimed that rising insurance costs have led 
physicians to reduce services by: 
• Retiring early.
• Relocating their practice to other states where insurance costs are lower.
• Restricting their scope of practice to exclude or reduce high-risk procedures or avoid high-risk 
patients. For example, obstetrician-gynecologists are said to be confi ning their practice to just 
gynecology, or to normal but not high-risk deliveries. 
These claims have been supported more by anecdote than by hard data, parti-
cularly in the early years of this malpractice crisis. More reliable evidence has begun to 
emerge, but remains limited. The extent to which these physician responses are occurring is a key 
policy issue because it potentially broadens the malpractice crisis from a problem for providers 
and malpractice carriers to a consumer health care access issue.
Researchers can evaluate these claims in several ways, but each is problematic (see Appendix 
II). While they have shortcomings, administrative datasets such as the American Medical 
Association’s Physician Masterfile are the best available sources of information about trends 
in the number of practicing physicians over time. Physician survey data are a better source of 
information about why physicians choose to stop practicing or move their practice, but because 
of response bias (discussed below), they produce less reliable estimates of the number of 
physicians who do so.
A number of studies have used one of the physician databases to measure physician supply and 
tested the relationship between supply and measures of the liability climate using multivariate 
regression analysis (Figure 1).2 Some of these studies have directly modeled the relationship 
between physician supply and indicators of the litigation environment, such as insurance premi-
ums, claims frequency, or claims payments in a state. Others have used tort reform laws to mea-
sure malpractice risk, a less direct measure of the liability climate. A key issue in physician-supply 
studies is adequately controlling for various market characteristics, aside from liability, that may 
affect physician supply. A few studies have used “difference-in-difference” analysis, which com-
pares the amount of change in physician supply in each state over time, to implicitly control for 
all state characteristics. Most studies use cross-sectional analyses that explicitly control for state 
characteristics by including them as explanatory variables in the model. Both are good method-
ologies if all the relevant variables are included in the model and the data are good measures of 
the variables. The studies we characterize as particularly strong have these features.
Three studies have found a significant association between malpractice risk and physician supply, 
three had no significant findings and two had mixed results. The results did not vary systematically 
with the particular measure of malpractice risk used: among studies modeling the effect of caps on 
noneconomic damages and other tort reforms on physician supply, for example, two studies had 
significant findings, one did not, and two were mixed. 
2  Multivariate regression is a statistical technique used to test the effect of one explanatory variable (e.g., malpractice premium lev-
els) on an outcome variable (e.g., state physician-to-population ratio) while holding many other variables constant.  It is useful for 
examining variations in physician supply across states because it lets the analyst control for characteristics on which states may 
differ and which may affect physician supply—for example, the average gross income of physicians in the state.  Just examin-
ing the association between malpractice insurance premiums and physician supply in a state without controlling for these other 
“confounding variables” might lead to a spurious conclusion that variations in supply are due to differences in premiums.
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Figure 1. Results of controlled studies on effect of malpractice environment on physician supply† 
Authors
Malpractice 
risk measure
Data 
years Findings 
Baicker & 
Chandra 2005 
(2)
(1) Premiums
(2) Claims 
payments
1993–2001 Not signiﬁ cant. Neither premiums nor payments were signiﬁ cantly associated with 
overall physician supply. 
Methodological comments: Strong analysis overall. Strengths: Controls for a good 
range of confounding variables. Separately tests effects on physician subgroups. 
Limitations: Inappropriate averaging of company-speciﬁ c premium data.
Kessler et al. 
2005 
(23)
“Direct” and 
“indirect” tort 
reforms
1985–2001 Signiﬁ cant. Direct reforms (e.g., caps on damages) were associated with three 
percent higher growth in physician supply after three years. The effect size varied 
by specialty, e.g., 12 percent difference for emergency medicine physicians but 
no signiﬁ cant difference for surgeons or radiologists. The effect was mainly due to 
retirements and entries rather than inter-state relocations. 
Methodological comments: Strong analysis overall. 
For more information, see Appendix III.
Matsa 2005 
(27)
Caps on damages 1970–2000 Not signiﬁ cant. The association between caps and overall physician supply was not 
signiﬁ cant, although caps did increase supply 10–12 percent from 1970 to 2000 for 
specialists in extremely rural areas.
Methodological comments: Strong analysis overall. 
For more information, see Appendix III.
Encinosa & 
Hellinger 2005 
(13)
Caps on damages 1985–2000 Mixed. Counties subject to any damages cap (whether $250,000 or higher) had two 
percent more physicians per capita than counties without caps (three percent in rural 
counties); the difference was statistically signiﬁ cant. However, results not published 
in the paper showed, counterintuitively, that the $250,000 cap was not signiﬁ cant 
but the higher cap was.
Methodological comments: Fairly strong analysis overall. 
For more information, see Appendix III.
Erus 2004 
(14)
(1) Premiums 
(2) AMA deems 
state in “crisis” 
(3) # claims
(4) Claims 
payments
1997–2002 Not signiﬁ cant. None of the indicators of malpractice risk showed a signiﬁ cant 
association with physician supply.
Methodological comments: Preliminary analysis, not yet perfected. Model requires 
more work before it can be deemed reliable. Strengths: Examines data through 
middle of current malpractice crisis. Weaknesses: State-level model did not identify 
any signiﬁ cant predictors of physician supply, and some ﬁ ndings are counterintuitive. 
Gius 2000 
(17)
Premiums 1994–1996 Signiﬁ cant. States with above-average medical malpractice insurance premiums 
had signiﬁ cantly fewer physicians per capita.
Methodological comments: Fairly strong analysis overall. Strengths: Model 
estimation method controls for endogeneity (two-way causation) between physician 
income and physician supply. Weaknesses: Exact nature of premium data is unclear. 
Does not examine dynamics during times of malpractice crisis.
Hellinger & 
Encinosa 2003 
(20)
Caps on damages 1985–2000 Signiﬁ cant. States with caps have, on average, 12 percent more physicians per 
capita than states without caps, although physician supply grew in both types of 
states.
Methodological comments: Not a strong analysis overall. 
For more information, see Appendix III.
Klick & 
Stratmann 
2003 
(24)
Caps on damages 1980–1998 Mixed results. Counterintuitively, the $250,000 cap was not signiﬁ cant but the 
$500,000 cap was. States with the higher cap had three percent more doctors per 
100,000 population than states without them.
Methodological comments: Not a strong analysis overall. 
For more information, see Appendix III.
† The dependent variable in all studies is the number of physicians in the state or number per capita as listed in the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile, 
except for Baicker and Chandra, who modeled the difference in the log number of physicians between 1993 and 2001. The strongest studies are cited in bold print.
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The strongest studies have found that the malpractice environment has had only 
small or no effects on the supply of physician services overall, although the impacts 
in certain specialties and in rural areas are somewhat higher. The most informative and reliable 
results may be those of Baicker and Chandra (2) because their study used a direct measure of li-
ability costs (professional liability insurance premiums) rather than an indirect measure (tort 
reforms) and estimated a well-specified model. That study found no significant association be-
tween premiums and physician supply. The strongest study using caps on damages as the measure 
of the liability climate is that of Kessler and colleagues, who found that caps were associated with 
three percent higher growth in physician supply three years after they were adopted (23). Most 
studies have not been designed to test whether some medical specialties are affected more than 
others, but Kessler and colleagues’ study did find some inter-specialty differences.
Survey studies also shed light on the relationship between liability costs and physician supply. As 
discussed in Appendix II, survey studies have both strengths and weaknesses compared to other 
approaches. The biggest weaknesses are low response rates and risk of response bias. One strong 
survey study (with a high response rate, strong sampling design and well-designed survey instru-
ment) is a 2003 study of physicians in specialties with high malpractice risk in Pennsylvania, one 
of the states most severely affected by rising insurance costs (30). This study found that only a 
small proportion of specialists definitely planned to retire early (seven percent) or relocate their 
practice out of state (four percent) within the next two years because of the cost of professional 
liability insurance. Larger proportions (32 percent and 29 percent, respectively) reported that they 
would likely do so. Forty-two percent of the specialists reported that they had already restricted 
their scope of practice, and 50 percent said they were likely to (continue to) do so over the next 
two years. 
This survey had a response rate of 65 percent, but may still have suffered from bias due to physi-
cians’ desire to give a socially correct response. Additionally, the sampling scheme was designed to 
produce a representative sample of physicians at highest malpractice risk, but is not generalizable 
to all specialties. Similarly, Pennsylvania is broadly representative of other states experiencing a 
malpractice crisis, but findings from Pennsylvania cannot be generalized to the national level. 
Few studies have directly examined whether access to high-risk services has 
been affected; the evidence base is not yet sufficient to answer this question. 
Direct evidence of effects on access to care would consist of data showing that measures of 
patient access, such as travel times and wait times for specialist services, have worsened in states 
affected by rising liability costs, and that this trend is unrelated to other things going on in those 
states. Evidence of changes in the supply of physicians constitutes only indirect evidence of an 
access-to-care problem, because it is possible that the baseline supply of providers was sufficiently 
large that patients still have good access to care even after some physicians leave practice.
In at least one survey study (30), physicians have reported that their patients have experienced 
increased travel times and wait times for specialist care. Such problems reportedly resulted both 
from malpractice pressure and from other factors, such as managed care restrictions. Other re-
search evidence does not indicate that significant reductions in access to care have occurred. Two 
studies have examined whether rates of utilization or provision of high-risk procedures are lower 
in states with heated liability environments than in other states. One, an uncontrolled, descrip-
tive analysis, found that the number of doctors performing craniotomies, cesarean sections and 
vaginal deliveries with complications in Florida, a state severely affected by rising insurance costs, 
decreased during the period of the latest malpractice crisis compared to 1997–2000. Rates of these 
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procedures and access to care (travel times), however, were largely unaffected (11). This study did 
not control for other factors that may have influenced the supply of doctors performing these 
services in Florida over the study period.
The other, a well-designed study that controlled for a range of factors that may affect health 
services utilization, examined whether rates of several procedures varied across states according 
to either malpractice insurance premiums or payments made in malpractice cases (2). The 
authors found no significant differences in rates of percutaneous coronary interventions, angio-
graphy, coronary artery bypass graft, cesarean section, transurethral prostatectomy, or radical 
prostatectomy. Mammography rates were higher in the states with higher premiums and payments. 
An important limitation of this study is that the procedure rates were for Medicare patients only. 
Doctors might be more inclined to avoid high-risk procedures for younger patients because they 
are statistically more likely to sue than elderly patients (6).
Longer-term effects on physician supply may occur that have not been documented. 
The studies discussed focus on short-term effects of changes in the malpractice environment 
on physician supply. There may also be longer-term effects. For example, deteriorations in the 
liability environment may dissuade college students from entering medical school, medical 
students from entering certain specialties, or medical residents from setting up their first practice 
in a state with high malpractice insurance premiums. 
One survey study suggests that residents who trained in Pennsylvania during the malpractice crisis 
were much less likely to stay in the state after residency than residents who trained there when the 
liability climate was calmer (29). In a state that is undersupplied with young physicians to begin 
with, the exit of newly qualified physicians could pose a long-term problem. There is no evidence 
that interest in particular specialties is correlated with perceived malpractice risk. Rather, medical 
students tend to choose their specialty based on a host of factors, including income and lifestyle 
(16, 31). 
“Defensive medicine” is difficult to measure, but is likely to become more preva-
lent when physicians perceive heightened malpractice risk.3 Pinning down the extent, 
costs and consequences of defensive medicine is notoriously difficult. In addition to the problem 
of trying to extrapolate national, systemwide costs on the basis of measurements drawn from a 
limited set of procedures, it is difficult to ascertain which procedures, tests, and referrals (called 
“assurance behaviors”) are ordered primarily out of legal concerns rather than medical judgment 
(5, 41). Physicians may have more than one reason for ordering a test, and it can be difficult to 
draw a clear line between the desire to avoid lawsuits and the desire to make absolutely sure that 
the patient receives an accurate diagnosis and all treatment that might benefit him (see Appendix 
II for further discussion of this issue).
One strong methodology for measuring defensive medicine is to compare rates of medical 
procedures that physicians might be inclined to order out of legal fear, such as magnetic resonance 
imaging and cesarean section, across geographic areas with different liability climates, controlling 
for other factors that might account for the differences in utilization of these procedures. Three 
well-designed studies have found that greater malpractice risk (measured by premiums or claims 
3  Defensive medicine can take two forms.  What is conventionally described as defensive medicine are “assurance behaviors,” in 
which physicians order tests, referrals, and procedures that are not medically justified primarily for the purpose of reducing legal 
risk.  But the “avoidance behaviors” discussed earlier in the Synthesis – withdrawing from practice or restricting scope of practice 
to exclude high-risk patients or procedures – could also be considered forms of defensive medicine.  This section of the Synthesis 
focuses on assurance behaviors.
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frequency in the area) was associated with small but statistically significant increases in the
incidence of cesarean sections (12, 26, 44). Other studies have had mixed results, with some 
providing corroborating evidence (18, 19, 36) and others finding no difference in cesarean rates 
(3, 37).
Although the methodological challenges probably mean that there will never be a completely 
accurate estimate of the extent of defensive medicine, studies consistently find that assurance 
behaviors are widespread and become even more so during malpractice crises (21, 41, 45). 
Two relatively recent, well-designed studies provide illustrative data. A 2003 survey of high-risk 
specialists in Pennsylvania found that 93 percent reported that they sometimes or often engaged 
in at least one of six assurance behaviors (41). Fifty-nine percent reported often ordering more 
diagnostic tests than were medically indicated; 52 percent often made unnecessary referrals to 
specialists; 33 percent prescribed more medications than were medically indicated; and 32 percent 
suggested unnecessary invasive procedures such as biopsies to confirm diagnoses. Physicians 
who were not confident about the adequacy of their liability coverage and physicians who 
perceived their insurance premiums to be very burdensome were significantly more likely to 
report these behaviors. 
One often-cited study used Medicare claims data and strong statistical methods to examine 
whether patients in states without strong tort reforms received more health care services than 
patients with the same diagnoses in states that had such reforms (21). It found that states that 
adopted “direct” tort reforms such as caps on damages experienced five percent slower growth 
in expenditures for patients admitted to the hospital for myocardial infarction, and nine percent 
slower growth in spending on patients with ischemic heart disease, between 1984 and 1990. This 
study has been somewhat controversial because the authors attempted to extrapolate national 
defensive-medicine costs from these two diagnoses (46) and a subsequent study failed to replicate 
the findings for other diagnoses (7). The study’s findings are probably not generalizable to all 
conditions or all patients, but its estimates for these two common conditions are quite defensible. 
Unlike the survey study discussed above, this study did not attempt to ascertain whether the extra 
costs generated in high-liability states were associated with care that the treating physicians found 
necessary and beneficial or care that was ordered primarily for defensive purposes.
What has been the impact of state tort reforms on premiums, claims 
frequency, claims payouts and physican supply? 
In response to the last three malpractice crises, states have implemented a limited 
range of tort reforms. The objective of conventional tort reforms (Figure 2) is to reduce the 
overall costs of malpractice litigation. The specific mechanisms for achieving this goal are: (1) 
erecting barriers to bringing suit (statutes of limitation/repose; attorney contingency-fee reform) 
or reaching trial (pretrial screening panels); (2) limiting the amount plaintiffs may take as an award 
(caps on damages, collateral-source rule reform); and (3) altering the way damages awards are paid 
(joint-and-several liability reform, periodic payment).
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Figure 2. Tort reforms commonly adopted by states
Reform Description
Caps on 
damages
Caps on damages limit the amount of money that a plaintiff can take as an award in a malpractice suit. 
The cap may apply to noneconomic damages (“pain and suffering”), total damages (including both 
noneconomic damages and economic loss such as medical expenses and lost wages), or only punitive 
damages (damages intended to punish the defendant for particularly wanton conduct; very rare in 
malpractice cases). The cap may apply to the plaintiff, limiting the amount she may receive, or to each 
defendant, limiting the total amount for which each may be liable. 
Joint-and-several 
liability reform
In cases involving more than one defendant, such as a physician and a hospital, this reform limits the 
ﬁ nancial liability of each defendant to the percentage fault that the jury allocates to that defendant. Without 
this reform, the plaintiff may collect the entire amount of the judgment from one defendant if the other(s) 
default on their obligation to pay, even if the paying defendant bore only a small share of the responsibility for 
what happened to the plaintiff. 
Statutes of limitations/ 
statutes of repose
These reforms limit the amount of time a patient has to ﬁ le a malpractice claim, typically to two or three 
years. Statutes of limitations bar suits unless they are ﬁ led within a speciﬁ ed time after the injury occurs 
or is discovered. Statutes of repose bar suits unless they are ﬁ led within a speciﬁ ed time after the medical 
encounter occurred, regardless of whether an injury has yet been discovered. 
Attorney contingency-fee 
reform
This reform limits the amount of a malpractice award that a plaintiff’s attorney may take in a contingent-fee 
arrangement. The limitation is typically expressed as a percentage of the award; it may also incorporate a 
maximum dollar value.
Collateral-source 
rule reform
This reform eliminates a traditional rule that if an injured plaintiff receives compensation for her injury from 
other sources, such as health insurance, that payment should not be deducted from the amount that a 
defendant who is found liable for that injury must pay.
Pretrial screening 
panels
Pretrial screening panels review a malpractice case at an early stage and provide an opinion about whether 
a claim has sufﬁ cient merit to proceed to trial. Typically, a negative opinion does not bar a case from going 
forward, but can be introduced by the defendant as evidence at the trial.
Periodic payment This reform allows or requires insurers to pay out malpractice awards over a long period of time, rather than 
in a lump sum. This enables insurers to purchase annuities (sometimes called “structured settlements”) from 
other insurance companies which cost less than paying the whole award up front. Insurers are also able to 
retain any amounts that the plaintiff does not actually collect during her lifespan. 
Tort reform has been on the legislative agenda in nearly all states that are experiencing volatility 
in their liability insurance market. With few exceptions, the reforms that states have adopted 
(as well as the reforms currently under consideration in the Congress) have reprised approaches 
taken to the crisis of the mid-1980s and have been limited in their aims and scope. Some states 
that did not pass tort reforms in the 1980s have recently done so; others have added to or 
strengthened reforms passed earlier.
Caps on damages have received the greatest attention by far. Twenty-six states now have some 
type of limitation on damages, mostly applying to the noneconomic component of awards 
(Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Caps on noneconomic and total damages by state as of April 2006
Source: Author’s analysis
Studies of the effects of these reforms tend to burgeon around times of malpractice crisis. There 
is a cluster of studies from the mid-1980s crisis and its aftermath and an emerging literature 
from the current crisis period. Most of the older studies are methodologically strong (they 
use strong econometric methods to analyze the effect of caps while controlling for important 
confounding variables). Their results have continued relevance, although the market and legal 
environments have changed somewhat over time. Most of the evidence concerning reforms 
other than caps on damages comes from these earlier studies. The newer studies vary in quality, 
but some valuable contributions to the literature have appeared over the last two years. The 
newer studies have focused primarily on evaluating caps on damages, because of the political 
interest in that reform. 
Total damages cap
$250,000 noneconomic damages cap
$250–500,000 noneconomic damages cap
> $500,000 noneconomic damages cap
No damages cap
DC
FL
OR
ME
MA
OK
OH
AK
Alaska: Increases to $1 million 
in severe cases.
Florida: Court may 
increase to $1 million. 
Ohio: Court may 
increase to $1 million. 
Oregon: $500,000 cap in wrongful death cases only. Oklahoma: $300,000 cap in obstetrical 
and emergency cases only. Maine: $400,000 cap in wrongful 
death cases only.
Massachusetts: 
Jury may waive cap
in severe cases only.
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Aside from caps on damages, most of these reforms have had limited efficacy 
(Figure 4). Two other reforms have had some effect. Joint-and-several liability reform has been 
found to constrain the growth of insurance premiums (but has no significant effect on claims 
payouts or physician supply). Study findings regarding shorter statutes of limitations/repose are 
mixed, but some strong studies have found an effect on claims frequency and premiums (effects 
on physician supply have not been tested, and there was no effect on claims payouts).
Attorney contingency-fee limits, despite their political appeal, have not been shown to have 
significant effects in the majority of studies. Collateral-source offsets, pretrial screening panels and 
periodic payment too, have rarely been found to have any significant effects. The continued inter-
est in these reforms is striking given the lack of evidence of their effectiveness. (For information 
on the methodological strengths and weaknesses of relevant studies, see Appendix III.) 
As shown in Figure 4, the size of the evidence base concerning the efficacy of reforms var-
ies across reforms. Some reforms have been extensively tested against each of the outcomes of 
interest (premiums, physician supply, claims payouts, and claim frequency). The effect of other 
reforms on some of the outcomes has not yet been tested. For example, no studies have examined 
whether joint-and-several liability reform affects claims frequency. 
The efficacy of caps on damages has been hotly disputed, and much of the evidence 
used in the policy debate is not based on rigorous analysis. Several methodological 
limitations should be considered when assessing the impact of caps, particularly their effects on 
insurance premiums.4 (These issues are discussed in greater detail in Appendix II):
• Simple descriptive studies are much more prevalent than controlled studies. 
• Comparison groups are sometimes constructed inappropriately. For example, states with 
recently adopted caps may be compared to a group that includes both states with older caps 
and states with no caps.
• Analyses may group states with different types of caps together, making it diffi cult to determine 
which type is causing observed effects.
• Information on trends in premiums or claims payouts may be presented without adjusting for 
the number of physicians in the population. 
• Statistics on “average premiums” in a state may present a simple average rather than a weighted 
average incorporating market-share information. 
• Data on trends in premiums, insurer losses, or award average size may not be adjusted for 
infl ation. 
Evidence about the impact of caps on average awards, claims frequency, insurance premiums, or 
physician supply that derives from simple state-to-state comparisons is not reliable. Inferences 
about the effects of caps should be drawn only on the basis of findings from well-designed, con-
trolled studies. Fortunately, there are several such studies (see Appendix III). Their findings have 
varied, however. 
4 A more detailed explanation of these methodological problems can be found in Michelle M. Mello and David M. Studdert, 
Understanding Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, working paper 2006.
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Figure 4. Results of controlled studies of the impact of tort reforms† 
Signiﬁ cant decrease in 
claims payouts?
Signiﬁ cant decrease in 
claims frequency?
Signiﬁ cantly lower liability 
insurance premiums?
Signiﬁ cant increase in physician 
supply?
Damages 
cap‡
YES: 
Danzon 1984 (8)
Danzon 1986 (9)
Sloan et al. 1989 (39)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 
1991(4)*
Viscusi & Born 2005 (49)*
NO:
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
Viscusi et al. 1993 (50)*
YES:
No studies
NO:
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
YES:
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
Danzon et al. 2004 (10)
Thorpe 2004 (43)
Viscusi & Born 2005 (49)
NO:
Sloan 1985 (38)
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 (4)
|
Viscusi et al. 1993 (50)
YES:
Klick & Stratmann 2003 (24)
|
Encinosa & Hellinger 2005 (13)
|
Hellinger & Encinosa 2003 (20)
NO:
Matsa 2005 (27)
Joint-and-
several 
liability 
reform
YES:
No studies
NO:
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 
1991 (4)*
Viscusi et al. 1993 (50)*
No studies.
YES:
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 (4)
Viscusi et al. 1993 (50)
|
Danzon et al. 2004 (10)
NO:
Thorpe 2004 (43)
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Klick & Stratmann 2003 (24)
Statutes of 
limitations/ 
repose
YES:
Danzon 1984 (8)
NO:
Sloan et al. 1989 (39) 
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52))
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 
(4)*
YES:
Danzon 1986 (9)
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
NO:
Danzon 1984 (8)
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Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
NO:
Sloan 1985 (38)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 (4)
No studies.
Attorney 
contingency- 
fee limit
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Danzon 1984 (8)
Danzon 1986 (9)
Sloan et al. 1989 (39) 
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 
(4)*
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Sloan 1985 (38)
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52))
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 (4)
Thorpe 2004 (43)
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Klick & Stratmann 2003 (24)
Collateral-
source 
offset§
YES: 
Danzon 1984 (8)
Danzon 1986 (9)
NO:
Sloan et al. 1989 (39) 
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 
(4)*
YES:
Danzon 1986 (9)
NO:
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52) 
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Sloan 1985 (38)
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 (4)
Danzon et al. 2004 (10)
Thorpe 2004 (43)
YES:
No studies.
NO:
Klick & Stratmann 2003 (24)
Pretrial 
screening 
panels
YES:
No studies.
NO: 
Danzon 1984 (8)
Danzon 1986 (9)
Sloan et al. 1989 (39) 
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
YES:
No studies.
NO: 
Danzon 1984 (8)
Danzon 1986 (9)
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
YES :
Sloan 1985 (38)
NO:
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52)
No studies.
Periodic 
payment
YES:
No studies.
NO: 
Danzon 1984 (8)
Sloan et al. 1989 (39)
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 
(4)*
YES:
No studies.
NO: 
Danzon 1984 (8)
YES:
No studies.
NO: 
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 1991 (4)
YES:
No studies.
NO: 
Klick & Stratmann 2003 (24)
† An earlier version of this table appeared in Studdert, 2004 (40). The 2005 study by Kessler et al. (23) is excluded because it grouped several reforms together, 
precluding the possibility of drawing inferences about the effects of particular reforms.
‡ Studies used different definitions of cap variable. Studies are classified as having significant findings if any specification of a damages cap variable was statisti-
cally significant.
* Study modeled insurer losses rather than average award size. Losses are a function of both average award and number of paid claims.
§ Some studies modeled mandatory and discretionary collateral offsets separately. Studies are classified as having significant findings if any specification of a 
collateral source offset variable was statistically significant.
|
 Study results were mixed.
The strongest studies are cited in bold print.
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Good evidence shows that caps on damages reduce average award size by 20–30 
percent, but there is no evidence that they decrease claims frequency. It is often 
argued that caps on damages will reduce claims frequency because claims with a lower potential 
value are less attractive to plaintiff’s attorneys working on a contingent-fee basis. Proponents of 
caps see this as a benefit of caps, in that total litigation costs will likely be lower if fewer claims are 
filed. Opponents of caps see it as a problem, because it suggests that plaintiffs with meritorious 
claims might not have access to the courts. One controlled study found that there was no signifi-
cant difference in frequency of claiming associated with caps on damages (52). The evidence base 
on this issue, however, consisting of only that one study, is insufficient for broad generalizations.
On the other hand, many studies have found that caps have a significant effect on claims payouts. 
Some studies have found that caps reduce total claims payouts or insurer losses (4, 49, 50) (see 
Appendix III). In the absence of evidence that caps reduce claims frequency, a reasonable infer-
ence is that the reduction is driven by lower average awards. Overall, caps appear to be associated 
with a 23 percent to 31 percent reduction in average awards. That caps reduce average awards 
should be uncontroversial because the literal effect of caps is to reduce awards. Of note, most of 
the evidence on this point comes from relatively old studies. It is possible that analysis of more 
recent data might yield a smaller effect on payouts, because increases in the costs of medical care 
may have led to growth over time in the economic component of malpractice awards as a propor-
tion of the total award. 
It is important to bear in mind that caps only apply to jury verdicts, although they may have a 
“shadow” effect on settlements. Less than ten percent of malpractice cases go to trial (48), and 
only some of these will result in a noneconomic damages award large enough to trigger the cap. 
A study of jury verdicts subject to the $250,000 cap in California found that 51 percent of the 
verdicts were reduced by the cap (42). An analysis of Missouri claims found that only six of 439 
paid claims reached its cap, which was $557,000 in that year (25). Thus, caps formally touch only a 
fraction of all claims. Nevertheless, the effect on total award costs may be significant because caps 
affect the most costly claims. 
The best studies suggest that caps are associated with a small increase in 
physician supply. Proponents of caps argue that they help states attract and retain physicians by 
providing relatively good insulation from malpractice judgments. Although it is insurers, and not 
physicians, who are responsible for paying large judgments, physicians as a group may feel 
the financial consequences over time in the form of higher insurance premiums. Until quite re-
cently, however, there were no controlled studies evaluating the impact of caps on damages 
on the supply of physicians in a state.
Five studies, only two of which have been published in peer-reviewed publications, have examined 
the relationship between caps and physician supply using statistical methods to control for other 
state and local characteristics that may influence how attractive a particular state is to physicians. 
Of these, two studies have found that states with caps experience significantly higher growth in 
physician supply over time (20, 23), one found no significant effect (27) and two produced mixed 
results (13, 24). Some of the studies are methodologically stronger than others, so all should not 
be relied upon equally. The study with the strongest methodology found that “direct reforms” 
such as caps on damages were associated with three percent higher growth in physician supply 
over three years (23). The major shortcoming of this study is that it cannot separate out the effect 
of caps on damages from other “direct reforms” such as collateral-source rule reform. Overall, a 
reasonable conclusion to draw from this group of studies is that caps appear to be associated with 
a small but statistically significant increase in physician supply.
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The most recent controlled studies show that caps moderately constrain the 
growth of premiums. A number of descriptive analyses by interest groups have linked caps 
with lower premiums. However, most of these studies are not very informative, because they do 
not control for other state characteristics that affect premiums, and suffer from other methodolog-
ical problems (see Appendices II and III). Studies from earlier malpractice crises suggest that caps 
on noneconomic damages did not reduce malpractice premiums in the 1970s and 1980s. Four 
studies are available from that era; three had no significant findings (38, 50, 52) and the fourth 
had mixed findings (it also lumped caps on noneconomic damages together with caps on total 
damages and caps on punitive damages) (4). 
In contrast, studies based on data from the 1990s and the early years of the current malpractice 
crisis consistently found that caps had a modest but statistically significant constraining effect on 
premiums during this period; the effect is on the order of a 6–13 percent reduction in the rate of 
growth (10, 22, 43, 49). It is not clear why study findings have differed across time periods. The 
more recent studies are the most useful because they best represent today’s market conditions. 
Although they are not without limitations, most of these studies are of good quality and their 
overall findings can be considered reliable. Specific methodological strengths and limitations are 
described in Appendix III.
A few caveats are in order. First, most of the existing studies do not control very well for differences 
in the extent of regulation of insurance premium rates across states, which could be influential. 
The respective roles of rate regulation and caps on damages in constraining premium growth has 
been controversial, particularly in understanding the experience of California, which adopted 
both types of reforms (see Appendix IV).
Second, most of the studies do not indicate what level of noneconomic damages cap has the 
largest effect on premiums or claims; they tend to lump different levels of caps together. Third, 
caps on damages do not reduce premiums in absolute terms. Premiums have been rising over time 
(even after adjustment for inflation) even in states with caps; it is just that they have been rising 
more slowly in those states. 
Finally, the effect of caps on premiums does not happen immediately. The studies indicate that 
some effects are typically experienced within a year, but the full effect does not manifest itself for 
three years. In summary, good evidence suggests that caps will have modest effects on the growth 
of insurance premiums over time; however, they will not prevent premium growth and they will 
not have large or immediate effects.
Caps on noneconomic damages have disadvantages relating to patient safety and 
equity in the medical liability system. When evaluating caps on damages as a policy solu-
tion, their impact on insurance costs is an important consideration, but so are two other con-
siderations: deterrence and fairness. Opponents of caps are concerned that limiting liability will 
negatively affect patient safety because they will undermine the incentives for “deterrence”—that is, 
not practicing in a negligent manner. Some legal scholars respond by noting that there is very little 
evidence that the current medical liability system has much of a deterrent effect. It is probably the 
case that whatever modest deterrent effect does exist, however, is diminished by reforms, such as 
caps on damages, that make lawsuits less consequential for health care providers and insurers. The 
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more general argument that caps do not address the problem of patient safety in the health care 
system is compelling. The aim of caps is simply to limit liability; caps are not meant to reduce the 
incidence of medical error and adverse events, and there is no reason to think they do so.
Another objection that is often raised to caps on noneconomic damages is that they are unfair. 
The argument asserts that caps disproportionately affect plaintiffs who are severely injured, elderly, 
or female. Elderly and female plaintiffs may be especially burdened by caps, according to this 
argument, because they are relatively low wage-earners; therefore, the noneconomic component of 
their award tends to be proportionately larger than that of younger and male plaintiffs. Evidence 
from studies of jury verdicts that were subject to California’s $250,000 cap on noneconomic dam-
ages shows that caps do indeed exacerbate existing inequities in compensation for medical injuries 
by disproportionately affecting the most severely injured plaintiffs (35, 42). The evidence that they 
disproportionately burden women or the elderly, however, is very limited (15, 35, 42).
In this malpractice crisis, a number of groups have expressed interest in alternative 
approaches to reform. The conventional reforms discussed so far, including caps on damages, 
have a limited goal: to reduce litigation costs, and thereby reduce malpractice insurance premiums. 
In a malpractice crisis, these are important goals. Many groups, however, have called for policy-
makers to consider more far-reaching reforms that would address other, more enduring problems 
with the medical liability system including its inefficiency, low rate of compensating injured 
patients, inequity in awarding compensation and lack of deterrence of medical errors. 
Among the major alternative reform approaches now receiving attention are the following:
• Schedules of Damages: Some groups are considering whether it is possible to reap the advantages 
of caps on damages while avoiding the associated political diffi culties and equity concerns 
by adopting a schedule of noneconomic damages. Schedules differ from fl at caps in that they 
classify injuries into different severity tiers and then attach a range of dollar values to each tier, 
rather than imposing a single ceiling on pain-and-suffering awards. Juries are presented with 
the schedule and advised to use it as a guideline in reaching a decision about a noneconomic 
damages award. Because they would reduce insurers’ uncertainty, particularly around very 
large judgments, damages schedules could help control the growth of insurance premiums. 
They also would help ensure that plaintiffs with similar injuries received similar noneconomic 
damages awards and that the size of the award increased with the severity of injury. To some, 
a signifi cant disadvantage of damages schedules is that they limit the discretion of the jury in 
making decisions about compensation. They also may be less effective at cost control than a 
low-value fl at cap.
• Patient safety improvement: Consumer groups and trial lawyers argue that the best way to 
reduce malpractice litigation costs is to reduce malpractice. If fewer medical errors were 
committed, they argue, there would be less litigation. They advocate implementation of clinical 
interventions that have been shown to be effective in reducing rates of adverse events—for 
example, the increased use of computerized physician order entry systems. The advantage 
of this approach is that, if successful, it would have the important dual benefi t of providing 
relief to health care providers and improving the health and safety of patients. The problem is 
that epidemiological studies of medical injury show that there is a very poor correspondence 
between adverse events and malpractice claims. That is, most negligent medical injuries don’t 
result in claims, and many injuries that aren’t actually due to negligence do result in claims. 
As a result, even large decreases in rates of medical injuries should not be expected to decrease 
claims rates by very much (28). 
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• Disclosure and “early offer” programs: Studies suggest that two of the major reasons why people 
fi le malpractice suits are that they need compensation for their economic losses, such as lost 
wages, and that they are angry because they feel their doctor or hospital did not address their 
injury in a candid and compassionate way. Some reformers argue that these factors could 
be addressed by prompt and candid disclosure of adverse events accompanied by offers of 
reasonable compensation for economic losses. “Early offer” proposals typically specify that 
providers offer full compensation for past and future economic losses in exchange for the 
patient agreeing not to seek additional compensation for pain and suffering in a lawsuit. These 
proposals represent a promising avenue for resolving claims more quickly and at lower cost, 
particularly claims that are relatively straightforward. They could have the added benefi t of 
preserving goodwill between the doctor, hospital and patient. Some lawyers object to such 
proposals because they fear that patients will be discouraged or barred from fi ling suit before 
they have had a chance to receive advice from a lawyer, who might explain that what is being 
offered by way of compensation is inadequate. They also object to the exclusion, in many 
proposals, of any compensation for noneconomic losses.
• Demonstration projects of administrative compensation: A number of groups are considering 
experimentation with pilot programs of administrative compensation, sometimes called “health 
courts.” This model removes the adjudication of medical malpractice claims from courts and 
sets up an administrative process to evaluate claims instead.5 The decision-making panel could 
be based at a hospital system, a liability insurer, or a state government agency. The panel would 
award compensation not just to patients injured by negligence, but to all patients whose injuries 
could have been avoided (a group that is larger than the group of injuries due to deviations 
from the standard of care). The panel would use decision guidelines to fast-track certain kinds 
of injuries for quick decisions based on the best available scientifi c evidence about their 
avoidability. These proposals show promise because they are simpler and more equitable but 
they are a tough sell politically in many jurisdictions. Administrative processes would be much 
more effi cient than judicial decision-making, in part because neutral medical experts would 
replace costly battles between experts hired by the parties. Greater effi ciency could result in 
considerable cost savings. Because a larger group of patients would be compensated under the 
expanded liability standard, however, the total costs of the system might not be lower.
5 Administrative compensation proposals are different from arbitration programs. Arbitration uses the same compensation standard 
and similar procedures to the ordinary judicial process, but a different adjudicator. Administrative compensation involves not only 
a different adjudicator but also a different compensation standard and claiming process.
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This Synthesis Report gives rise to a number of conclusions and policy implications.
First, malpractice crises are likely to recur. The U.S. has experienced three malpractice 
crises in the last thirty years, and none of the contributing conditions have changed or are likely 
to change. Thus, even though the malpractice insurance environment appears to be stabilizing in 
some states, it remains important and timely to consider appropriate policy responses to malprac-
tice crises.
Second, malpractice crises affect the supply and delivery of health care services, 
though the magnitude of the effect is sometimes overstated and difficult to mea-
sure. Some of the claims that have been made about the effects of rising insurance costs during 
this malpractice crisis on patient care are probably exaggerated, but there is a modest effect on the 
supply of physicians. Malpractice crises also appear to be associated with heightened defensive-
medicine behavior.
Third, no single policy solution will address all of the factors that lead to malprac-
tice crises. The current malpractice crisis has multifaceted origins (which are discussed in more 
detail in the Primer in this series). Increased claims costs, imprudent insurer business decisions, 
decreased insurer investment returns, and other dynamics of the “insurance cycle” have all been 
contributing factors. Most policy strategies to address the crisis, such as caps on damages, have 
limited aims and impacts. They may be fairly effective at addressing one of the drivers, but not all 
of them. Some of the drivers, such as the insurance cycle, are temporary and essentially self-cor-
recting. Policy-makers may prefer to let the market correct itself rather than intervene with tort 
reforms or insurance regulation. This strategy means that there will be good times and bad in the 
professional liability insurance market. Relying on the market would not necessarily preclude as-
sistance for health care providers, such as premium subsidies or reimbursement increases, during 
periods of rapidly rising premiums. 
Fourth, caps on damages help constrain growth in litigation costs and insurance 
premiums over time, but disproportionately burden the most severely injured 
patients. There is good evidence that caps reduce average award size and moderately constrain 
the growth of premiums. Most of their effect on premiums is seen over the medium term, not 
immediately. Caps have a small, albeit statistically significant, effect on physician supply. Fairness 
objections to caps on damages should be taken seriously, however. The evidence shows that rather 
than discouraging “frivolous” litigation, they disproportionately burden the most severely injured 
patients. There are probably less onerous ways to bring greater predictability and cost control to 
the liability system, such as damages schedules and programs that encourage early settlement.
Finally, malpractice crises bring new attention to some of the fundamental 
problems with the medical liability system, which require more sweeping reform. 
A compelling body of evidence establishes that the liability system performs poorly as a mecha-
nism for directing compensation to injured patients in a thorough and equitable fashion, deterring 
medical error, and fostering an environment that supports patient safety initiatives such as adverse 
event reporting. Although they present more political challenges, reform proposals such as early-
offer programs and health courts merit serious consideration and objective assessment. 
Impl cations for Policy-Makers
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Efforts should be made to improve the availability and quality of state data on 
claims and premiums. Efforts to evaluate the causes and consequences of the malpractice crisis 
have been frustrated by a lack of comprehensive, accessible data on malpractice claims and insur-
ance premiums. This flows in part from the fact that malpractice law and insurance are matters of 
state law: there are few national databases and reporting requirements. Even within states, there is 
typically no systematic aggregation of data from individual trial courts, and departments of insur-
ance vary in what they collect from individual insurance companies. 
A recent report by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners recommended that 
state insurance regulators begin collecting comprehensive data on frequency of claims and 
average awards and major claim types represented, and maintain these data in a way that is 
useful for research purposes (32). Also needed are data on specialty-specific premium rates. 
Insurance commissioners are well situated to implement such reporting requirements, and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners could serve as a vehicle for standardizing 
reporting across states and combining reports into a multi-state database that could be made 
available, in de-identified form, to researchers. 
The Need for Additional Information
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Methodological approach 
The methodological approach for this synthesis was guided by its objective of educating policy-
makers about the differences between reliable and unreliable evidence concerning the causes and 
consequences of the malpractice crisis and potential solutions. We reviewed both high-quality 
studies and evidence of lesser quality; evaluated and distinguished them using accepted criteria of 
scientific rigor; and formulated our conclusions based on the best available evidence. 
The criteria of scientifi c rigor that we applied included:
• Use of a data source that was suffi ciently comprehensive to support the planned analyses
• Low potential for measurement error, nonrepresentativeness and other forms of bias in 
the data used
• Appropriateness of the analytical method chosen
• Adequacy of control for potentially confounding variables
• Adequacy of the sample size
• Appropriateness of the interpretation of data and conclusions drawn.
We comprehensively reviewed studies published in the academic literature, identifying candidate 
studies by searching PubMed, Westlaw, EconLit and online resources such as the Social Science 
Research Network and the National Bureau of Economic Research. We also identified studies by 
reviewing the lists of references cited in publications culled from those sources. We limited our 
review to studies from the mid-1980s forward.
Because the “grey literature”—unpublished reports and position papers—on the malpractice 
crisis is voluminous, our review is limited to analyses that have featured prominently in the 
policy debate at the national level. Our review included reports issued by or promoted or 
disseminated by the following influential organizations: the U.S. General Accountability 
Office, the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), the American Medical Associa-
tion, the American Trial Lawyers Association, the American Bar Association, Weiss Ratings, Inc., 
Tillinghast Towers-Perrin, Americans for Insurance Reform, the Center for Justice and Democracy, 
Public Citizen, the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, Milliman USA, Brown 
Brothers Harriman, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the Kaiser Family 
Foundation and the Physician Insurers Association of America.
Where the findings of well-designed studies conflicted with the findings of weaker studies, we 
aimed to explain why the findings of the weaker studies were less reliable. Where the findings 
of well-designed studies conflicted with one another, we identified methodological choices and 
issues (if any) that may explain the disparities. Where there was no scientific reason to place more 
credence in one set of findings than another, we characterized the state of knowledge about that 
point as one of ongoing uncertainty. In formulating conclusions that specifically relate to the 
current malpractice crisis, we placed more weight on evidence from recent studies than on studies 
from previous malpractice crises, since conditions in the insurance and health care markets may 
have changed over time. 
Appendix II Methodological Discussion
Medical malpractice: Impact of the crisis and effect of state tort reforms | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 10 | 21 
FindingsAppendix II Methodological Discussion
Issues in measuring effects of malpractice environment on the supply of 
physician services
Claims about retirements, relocations, and restrictions on scope of practice could 
be investigated through several approaches, but each is problematic. First, physician 
self-reports can be collected. Several medical societies in crisis states, for example, have asked phy-
sicians to report their personal stories of having to leave or alter their medical practice. This some-
times produces large counts of affected physicians, but there is no way to know what percentage 
of affected physicians has offered their stories, how representative those stories are of physicians’ 
experiences generally, or whether reporting physicians are providing all the relevant information. 
 
Using an alternative approach, several medical societies and independent research studies have 
conducted physician surveys. One difficulty with these surveys, particularly those done by medi-
cal societies, is that they tend to have low response rates, in part because busy physicians are often 
reluctant to participate. Surveys with low response rates (under 60 percent) should be interpreted 
with caution; response rates of less than 45–50 percent should trigger great caution, particularly if 
the survey does not provide information on whether the people who responded differ significantly 
on some important characteristic from those who did not respond. 
Surveys with higher response rates are more likely to provide representative data, but they still suf-
fer from a potential response-bias problem. Physicians have a strong incentive to report that their 
increased insurance costs are affecting their ability to offer health services, because this builds the 
case for policy interventions. Many physician organizations have lobbied hard for reforms such 
as caps on damages, and individual physicians may feel a need to buttress their efforts. This may 
lead them to consciously or unconsciously exaggerate their responses. As well, surveys that elicit 
information on decisions that physicians plan to carry out in the future may not capture what 
physicians actually end up doing. Physicians may change their mind about retiring, for example, or 
may find it is impossible to establish a practice in another state. Thus, survey reports may tend to 
overestimate the effects of a malpractice crisis on the supply of physician services in a state.
An alternative methodology is to count physicians using datasets such as state licensure rolls 
or the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile, which compiles information on 
practicing physicians based on surveys and other data sources. Such datasets, however, have short-
comings. Licensure lists may not distinguish between physicians who are actively practicing full 
time and physicians who are inactive or who spend a large portion of their time on nonclinical 
activities. The Physician Masterfile is subject to reporting lags and is known to produce overesti-
mates of physician supply and to have poor sensitivity in detecting physician retirements and relo-
cations. Neither type of dataset captures shifts in the scope of practice within a clinical specialty.
This type of analysis also cannot provide information on the reasons physicians choose to retire, 
relocate, or stop offering some kinds of service. Similarly, simply counting the number of hospitals 
in crisis states that have stopped providing certain services may wrongly attribute some decisions 
to malpractice concerns. A 2003 investigation by the U.S. General Accounting Office of several 
reports of hospital service closures found support for some claims that these decisions were made 
because of liability costs, but found that there were other reasons that some of the facilities had 
closed (47). Overall, datasets on the number of providers could produce either an overestimate 
or an underestimate of the supply of services, and cannot causally link changes in the supply of 
services to malpractice insurance issues.
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Finally, understanding the effects of a malpractice crisis on access to care is challenging because 
just knowing how many physicians stopped practicing in the state is not enough; one must also 
know something about how well-supplied the area was to begin with, and what the demand for 
services is. Even areas that lose a lot of physicians may not experience access-to-care problems if 
they were initially oversupplied. On the other hand, rural and other underserved areas may suffer 
greatly from the loss of even a single neurosurgeon. 
Issues in measuring defensive medicine
Defensive medicine is often measured using physician surveys. Physicians may be asked general 
questions about the frequency of different behaviors, such as ordering unnecessary biopsies. Al-
ternatively, they may be presented with hypothetical clinical scenarios and asked to say what they 
would do. General questions may be particularly susceptible to physicians’ desire to give socially 
correct responses. Scenarios may elicit more concrete and genuine responses, but cannot easily 
elicit physicians’ reasons for choosing different courses of action. 
Studies comparing inter-state variation in rates of particular procedures that physicians might be 
inclined to order defensively can be powerful. However, because there are many factors that give 
rise to variation in the way medicine is practiced across geographic areas, it is critical that such 
studies adequately control for other state and local characteristics before inferring that variations 
are attributable to differences in the litigation and insurance environments. 
Issues in measuring the effects of caps on damages
Simple descriptive studies purporting to establish the effects of caps on damages 
are much more prevalent than controlled studies. Descriptive data are problematic be-
cause there are many aspects of the legal, political, economic and insurance-market environments 
of states that affect claims frequency and award size, insurance premiums and physician supply. 
Comparisons of trends in litigation, premiums, or physician supply in different states are only 
valid if the states are similar in terms of other factors that are believed to affect these variables. 
The two major approaches taken to control for state characteristics are (1) to include variables rep-
resenting each characteristic in the regression model; and (2) to use a model estimation method, 
such as difference-in-difference analysis, that implicitly controls for state characteristics by exam-
ining only the magnitude of change in the outcome variable for each state over time. Both are 
appropriate if done correctly.
Comparison groups may be inappropriate for the analysis. For example, one recent 
interest-group press release presented a bar chart comparing the average amount by which insur-
ance premiums increased in 2003–2004 in “states recently passing damage caps” compared to 
“states without new damage caps” (1). It concluded that caps do not restrain premium growth 
because the average increase was much higher in the states that had recently adopted caps. But 
the comparison group evidently included both states without caps and states with older caps. The 
appropriate comparison would be to states without caps only—and then only after controlling for 
ways in which the capped and uncapped states differed.
Different kinds of caps may be lumped together in the analysis, making it difficult 
to determine which type is driving observed effects. In academic studies, different 
kinds of caps on noneconomic damages (for example, $250,000 flat caps and higher, inflation-
adjusted caps) are often not distinguished in the analysis. In the grey literature, the blurring can 
be even worse: for example, in one widely cited report, the analysts grouped states with caps on 
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noneconomic damages together with states that capped total damages (34). A cap on total damages 
is a far more stringent type of cap, one not under serious consideration by any legislature today. The 
same report also failed to include one state that did have a noneconomic damages cap. The report 
concluded that states with caps had much more favorable insurer loss ratios than in the other states, 
but when the correct states are included in each group, the difference is much smaller.
Information on trends in premiums or claims payouts may be presented without 
adjusting for the number of physicians in the population. For example, one widely publi-
cized graph compared “Premium Growth” in California versus the U.S. in general over the 1976-2000 
period with no indication that what was actually reported was not per-capita physician premiums, but 
rather the total amount that insurers in California and the entire U.S. collected in physician premiums 
(33). Total premiums reflect not only the price of insurance but also the quantity of policies sold. We 
cannot tell if an increase in total premiums means that doctors are paying more for their insurance, or 
if the insurer is just selling more policies. If the number of physicians paying premiums in California 
changed at a different rate over time than the number of physicians paying premiums nationwide, the 
trendlines on this chart would give rise to a wrong inference about what physicians in different loca-
tions were paying. When the data underlying this graph are adjusted for the number of physicians, it 
becomes clear that: (1) the absolute difference between what a physician pays for insurance in Califor-
nia and what he pays elsewhere, on average, is not as large as a viewer of the graph would think; it’s 
just a few hundred dollars; and (2) California did not do much better than the U.S. average over the 
study period, with the notable exception of the years running up to the current tort crisis (1998–2000).
Statistics on “average premiums” in a state are often based on a questionable use of 
company-specific premium data. The most widely cited source of premium data is the annual 
insurer survey conducted by the insurance industry newsletter The Medical Liability Monitor. This sur-
vey collects and reports company-specific premiums for three medical specialties for different regions 
of the state. The survey is a valuable data source, but it is not meant to support estimates of statewide 
average premiums, in part because not all companies participate in the survey. But a bigger issue is that 
most analyses compute a simple average premium for all the companies in the state without adjusting 
for the fact that the companies may have very different market shares. Computing a simple aver-
age, rather than a weighted average, treats the companies as though they have identical shares of the 
market. Adjusting for market share and also for the number of physicians insured in each region of the 
state can make a big difference in the estimate of statewide average premiums: for Kentucky in 2002, 
for example, the simple average premium for obstetrician-gynecologists was $58,287 but the weighted 
average premium was 19 percent less ($48,897) (51). 
Data on trends in premiums, insurer losses, or average award size over time may not 
be adjusted for inflation. This leads to artificially steep trendlines, suggesting that increases in costs 
are larger than they were in real terms.
Appendix II Methodological Discussion
24 | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 10 | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | Medical malpractice: Impact of the crisis and effect of state tort reforms
Findings
Authors Data Years Findings Methodological comments
Sloan et al. 1985 (38) 1974–1978 Not signiﬁ cant. Neither a cap on provider’s 
liability nor a cap on plaintiff’s recovery reduced 
premiums signiﬁ cantly. 
Fairly strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Uses per-capita premium data, 
rather than total premiums collected (which 
does not control for the number of physicians 
paying those premiums). Separately tests 
different kinds of caps.
Limitations: Examines only short-term effect of 
caps passed in mid-1970s. Groups all types of 
caps together.
Danzon 1986 (9) 1975-1984 Signiﬁ cant: Having any kind of damages cap 
reduced the average award size by 23 percent. 
Strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Controls for six other tort reforms 
and many other factors that may affect average 
award size. 
Limitations: Data drawn from only eight 
insurers—may not be representative. Groups all 
types of caps together. Cannot examine long-
term (post-1984) effect of caps.
Sloan et al. 1989 (39) 1975–1978, 
1984
Signiﬁ cant. Average award size was 31 percent 
lower in states with caps on noneconomic 
damages than in uncapped states. 
Strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Controls for 19 other tort reforms. 
Separately tests different kinds of caps. 
Limitations: Potentially inadequate control for 
plaintiff characteristics that determine size of 
economic damages awards.
Zuckerman et al. 1990 (52) 1974–1986 Not signiﬁ cant. Neither a cap on noneconomic 
damages nor a cap on total physician liability 
reduced average award size or claims 
frequency signiﬁ cantly. Premiums in states 
with caps on noneconomic damages were 
no lower than in states without caps on 
noneconomic damages. (However, having a cap 
on total physician liability reduced premiums for 
general surgeons by an average of 13 percent 
in the year after adoption and 34 percent over 
the longer term.)
Very strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Controls for a very wide range 
of confounding variables. Separately tests 
different kinds of caps. 
Limitations: Large number of variables included 
in the model may have adversely affected the 
statistical power of the model (its ability to 
detect signiﬁ cant effects).
Blackmon & Zeckhauser 
1991 (4)
1985–1988 Mixed. In a model controlling for only four other 
kinds of tort reforms, having any kind of cap 
(whether on punitive or noneconomic damages) 
reduced insurer losses by 44 percent. 
However, in a model including a fuller range of 
other tort reforms, caps were not statistically 
signiﬁ cant. 
Not a strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Tests different model speciﬁ cations 
to examine robustness of results. 
Limitations: Results in the restricted model are 
out of proportion to all other studies and not 
replicated in the more fully speciﬁ ed model. 
No control for state characteristics other than 
personal income growth. Cannot examine long-
term effects of reforms passed in mid-1980s. 
Uses total rather than per-capita premium data. 
Groups together all kinds of caps.
Viscusi et al. 1993 (50) 1985-1988 Not signiﬁ cant. Insurer losses in states with 
any kind of noneconomic damages cap were 
not signiﬁ cantly lower. Premiums in states with 
any kind of damages cap were no lower than in 
uncapped states.
Not a strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Separately tests different kinds of 
caps. 
Limitations: Incomplete controls for other tort 
reforms and inappropriate method of controlling 
for them. Uses total rather than per-capita 
premium data.
Kessler & McClellan 1997 
(22)
1984-1993 Signiﬁ cant. Growth in self-reported premiums 
in states adopting “direct” tort reforms (either 
noneconomic or total damages cap, abolition 
of punitive damages, abolition of mandatory 
prejudgment interest, or collateral-source rule 
reform) was 8.4 percent lower at three years 
post-adoption. After one year, the effect size 
was 2.1 percent.
Fairly strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Estimation method provides very 
strong control for state characteristics. 
Limitations: Groups together all kinds of caps, 
and groups caps with other tort reforms, so 
effect of noneconomic caps cannot be isolated. 
Uses self-reported rather than actual premium 
data. 
 Appe dix III Summary of Studies on Impact of Caps on Noneconomic Damages†
† Table adapted from Michelle M. Mello and David M. Studdert, Understanding Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, working paper 2006.
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Klick & Stratmann 2003 (24) 1980-1998 Mixed results. Counterintuitively, $250,000 caps 
did not signiﬁ cantly affect physician supply but 
$500,000 caps did. States with the higher cap 
had three percent more doctors per 100,000 
population than states without them.
Not a strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Estimation method and model 
speciﬁ cation provide very strong control for 
state characteristics. Separately tests different 
levels of caps. 
Limitations: So many controls for state 
characteristics that model may be 
overspeciﬁ ed. Results are counterintuitive.
Hellinger & Encinosa 2003 
(20)
1985-2000 Signiﬁ cant. States with caps have, on average, 
12 percent higher physician supply per capita 
than states without caps, although physician 
supply has grown in both types of states.
Not a strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Good controls for state 
characteristics other than tort reforms
Limitations: Does not control for other tort 
reforms. Estimation method is not appropriate 
to the structure of the dataset. Groups together 
all kinds of caps.
Danzon et al. 2004 (10) 1994-2003 Mixed. Caps on noneconomic damages of 
$500,000 or lower were associated with six 
percent lower growth in premiums. Caps 
above that level did not signiﬁ cantly affect 
premiums.
Not a particularly strong analysis overall.
Strengths: Separately tests different kinds of 
caps. Sophisticated estimation method.
Limitations: Inappropriate averaging of 
company-speciﬁ c premium data. Potentially 
overspeciﬁ ed model.
Matsa 2005 (27) 1970-2000 Not signiﬁ cant. The association between 
caps and overall physician supply was not 
signiﬁ cant, although caps did increase supply 
10–12 percent from 1970 to 2000 for specialists 
in extremely rural areas.
Strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Good controls for state 
characteristics including tort reforms. 
Sophisticated estimation method.
Limitations: Groups together all kinds of caps.
Thorpe 2004 (43) 1985-2001 Signiﬁ cant. Having any kind of noneconomic 
damages cap reduced the growth of premiums 
by 12.7 percent.
Strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Good controls for state 
characteristics including tort reforms. Models 
both total premiums and per-capita premiums. 
Limitations: Groups together all kinds of caps.
Viscusi & Born 2005 (49) 1984–1991 Signiﬁ cant. States with any kind of 
noneconomic damages cap had 16 percent 
lower insurer losses and 6.2 percent lower 
growth in premiums than uncapped states.
Not a particularly strong analysis overall.
Strengths: Longitudinal analysis method 
captures change over time. Good controls 
for market factors affecting premiums and 
losses. Thorough sensitivity analyses conﬁ rm 
robustness of results. 
Limitations: Incomplete controls for other tort 
reforms. Groups together all kinds of caps. 
Uses total rather than per-capita premium data.
Encinosa & Hellinger 2005 
(13)
1985-2000 Mixed. Counties subject to any damages 
cap (whether $250,000 or higher) had two 
percent higher physician supply per capita 
than counties without caps (three percent in 
rural counties); the difference was statistically 
signiﬁ cant. However, results not published in 
the paper showed, counterintuitively, that the 
$250,000 cap was not signiﬁ cant but the higher 
cap was.
Fairly strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Good controls for state 
characteristics including tort reforms. Sensitivity 
analyses tested different levels of caps 
separately. 
Limitations: Unpublished results are 
counterintuitive, raising questions about the 
model. 
Kessler et al. 2005 (23) 1985-2001 Signiﬁ cant. “Direct reforms” (e.g., caps on 
damages) are associated with three percent 
higher growth in physician supply after three 
years. The effect size varies by specialty, e.g., 
12 percent difference for emergency medicine 
physicians but no signiﬁ cant difference for 
surgeons or radiologists. The effect is mainly 
due to retirements and entries rather than inter-
state relocations. 
Strong analysis overall. 
Strengths: Estimation method provides very 
strong control for state characteristics. 
Limitations: Groups together all kinds of caps, 
and groups caps with other tort reforms, so 
effect of noneconomic caps cannot be isolated. 
Appe dix III Summary of Studies on Impact of Caps on Noneconomic Damages†
† Table adapted from Michelle M. Mello and David M. Studdert, Understanding Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, working paper 2006.
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Tort-reform advocates point to California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) 
as proof that caps on noneconomic damages can combat volatility in professional liability insur-
ance premiums. MICRA was a package of tort reforms that included a non-inflation-adjusted 
limit of $250,000 on noneconomic damages. MICRA was passed in 1975, but legal challenges to 
its constitutionality were not settled until 1985. Opponents of MICRA-style reforms argue that 
California’s lower premium growth is due not to MICRA, but to an insurance reform package 
known as Proposition 103 (Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1861.01–.16), approved by California voters on 
November 8, 1988. The most important features affecting professional liability insurance were (1) 
a requirement that insurers immediately roll back their rates by 20 percent; and (2) a requirement 
that insurers submit proposed changes in their rates for prior approval by the state insurance com-
missioner after November 8, 1989.
Evaluating competing claims about MICRA and Prop. 103 is challenging; no rigorous studies 
of its effects on malpractice premiums have been undertaken. There is a temporal correlation 
between the passage of Prop. 103 and the leveling off of malpractice premiums in California 
around 1988–1989; however, it is difficult to infer a casual relationship because of two potentially 
confounding factors. First, legal challenges to MICRA were settled shortly before then, and one 
would expect the full effect of MICRA to manifest itself at that time. Second, the malpractice cri-
sis of the mid-1980s started to abate around this time in many states across the country. One way 
of analyzing the effect of Prop. 103 is to examine how the specific regulatory provisions actually 
played out. California is not the only state to adopt a prior-approval requirement; about a dozen 
states have such a rule. A handful of academic studies have analyzed the influence of rate-regula-
tion regimes on malpractice premiums and most have not found prior approval to be a significant 
predictor, although one well-designed, controlled study did find that prior-approval states had 
lower premiums in the late 1970s and early 1980s (52).
The effect of a prior-approval rule may vary depending on how stringently the insurance com-
missioner exercises his discretion to disapprove proposed rate changes. Data from the California 
Department of Insurance on closed rate filings show that in 2000–2003, the Department received 
59 medical malpractice insurer requests for rate increases (not including requests from insurers 
that handled only dentists or podiatrists). Excluding five cases in which the insurer withdrew the 
request, the Department approved the full increase or close to the full increase requested 89 per-
cent of the time. The median premium increase approved was 11 percent and the largest was 80 
percent. The Department received eight requests for rate decreases and fully approved all of them. 
These findings suggest that during the period of the malpractice crisis, the prior-approval rule has 
infrequently prevented insurers in California from receiving requested rate increases. It is possible 
that it deterred some from requesting increases.
What about the 20 percent rollback? In the early years of Prop. 103, three malpractice insurers 
reportedly returned over $89 million to physicians due to the rollback. However, in 1994, the 
California courts held that the automatic 20 percent rollback provision was unconstitutional be-
cause it could deprive insurers of a fair rate of return. Subsequently, the insurance commissioner 
softened the provision: insurers would only have to reduce premiums insofar as their rate of re-
turn exceeded a “fair” rate of 10 percent. Thus, Prop. 103 has effected some rebates of malpractice 
premiums, but they have not been as large as voters intended. 
In summary, the uniqueness of Prop. 103’s particular combination of insurance reforms, and the 
fact that its adoption coincided with a significant shift in the malpractice insurance environment na-
tionwide, makes it difficult to rigorously test its effect on malpractice premiums. It seems likely that 
both Prop. 103 and MICRA have played a role in controlling the growth of premiums in California.
Notest s
Notes
For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis Project 
Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, 
please go to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail message to pubsrequest@rwjf.org. 
PROJECT CONTACTS
David C. Colby, Ph.D., the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Claudia H. Williams, AZA Consulting
SYNTHESIS ADVISORY GROUP
Linda T. Bilheimer, Ph.D., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Jon B. Christianson, Ph.D., University of Minnesota
Jack C. Ebeler, The Alliance of Community Health Plans 
Paul B. Ginsburg, Ph.D., Center for Studying Health System Change
Jack Hoadley, Ph.D., Georgetown University Health Policy Institute
Haiden A. Huskamp, Ph.D., Harvard Medical School
Julia A. James, Independent Consultant
Judith D. Moore, National Health Policy Forum
William J. Scanlon, Ph.D., Health Policy R&D 
Michael S. Sparer, Ph.D., Columbia University
The Synthesis Project
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Route 1 & College Road East
P.O. Box 2316
Princeton, NJ 08543-2316
E-Mail: synthesisproject@rwjf.org
Phone: 888-719-1909
www.policysynthesis.org
THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT
NEW INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH RESULTS
RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 10
MAY 2006 
